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ESTATE TAXATION OF JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY SPOUSES WITH FUNDS GENERATED FROM
THE FAMILY BUSINESS-THE "FAMILY PARTNERSHIP"
EXCEPTION TO SECTION 2040
ERIC D WHITESELL*
INTRODUCTION
When a husband and wife hold property jointly with a right of
survivorship and together participate in running a family business,
the death of one spouse presents unique tax problems for the survi-
vor. Problems arise because the federal estate tax provides that on
the death of a joint tenant the entire value of the property owned
in joint tenancy is included in the decedent's gross estate, except for
the portion attributable to the consideration furnished by the survi-
vor.' This Article addresses itself to the dilemma of the surviving
spouse who is anxious to avoid the inclusion of the entire value of
such jointly held property in the taxable estate of the decedent. This
Article discusses those cases which have excluded a portion of the
value of the jointly held business property on a partnership theory
and also traces the development of the case law in which taxpayers
have argued for application of the exception in section 2040(a) -
that is, the "consideration furnished" exception. Further, this Arti-
cle describes the evolution of the 1978 amendment to section 2040
which gives statutory recognition to the rights of surviving spouses
in jointly owned and operated family businesses.
* B.S., M.B.A., Virginia Commonwealth University; J.D., T.C. Williams Law School,
University of Richmond; M.L.T., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. Associate, Gillespie, Gillespie & Hart, Tazewell, Virginia.
1. Section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
(a) General Rule. -- The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants by the
decedent and any other person, or tenants by the entirety by the decedent and
spouse, or deposited, with any person carrying on the banking business, in their
joint names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as
may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have
been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
I.R.C. § 2040.
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EVOLUTION OF SECTION 2040
The broad statutory language that includes the full value of prop-
erty held jointly with a right of survivorshp 2 in the estate of the first
spouse to die initially appeared in section 202(c) of the Revenue Act
of 1916, the forerunner of section 2040 in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. The 1916 Act created a statutory presumption that the full
value of jointly held property was to be included in the estate of the
first to die but excepted any part of such property that could be
shown to have belonged originally to the survivors and never to have
belonged to the decedent.4 Section 402(d) of the 1921 Revenue Act
further refined the statute by adding two amendments. The first
amendment closed a loophole that arose when the decedent made a
gift of money or other property to his spouse which subsequently was
used to purchase jointly held property The second amendment ad-
dressed the situation in which neither joint tenant furnished consid-
eration and provided that when the property was acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or inheritance, only the decedent joint tenant's
proportional part of such property was to be included in his gross
2. Section 2040 has no application to property held by decedent and any other person as
tenants m common. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b); Estate of Trafton v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 610,
617 (1956) (referring to former § 811(e), acq. at 1957-1 C.B. 5). All references to "joint
tenants" or "joint interests" in the text refer to interests held as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship or tenancy by the entirety as at common law.
3. The relevant provisions of the 1916 Act are as follows:
Sec. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
(c) To the extent of the interest therein held jointly or as tenants in the entirety
by the decedent and any other person except such part thereof as may be
shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have be-
longed to the decedent.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
4. This exception gave rise to the judicial development of a "consideration furnished" test
which requires the surviving spouse to trace his specific contributions made in money or
money's worth toward the acquisition of the jointly held property in order to overcome the
statutory presumption of full inclusion in the estate of the first to die. The difficulty in tracing
consideration furnished over long periods of time, combined with disputes as to what consti-
tutes consideration in money or money's worth, has frequently resulted in litigation wherein
the complainant surviving spouse is without adequate records and then is unable to overcome
the statutory presumption. See, e.g., Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S.
160 (1931); Foster v. Comm'r, 90 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1937), affl'd, 303 U.S. 618 (1938); Bushman
v. United States, 8 F Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Estate of Heidt v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 969 (1947),
aff'd, 170 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948).
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estate. Except for minor revisions of language, 5 the statute remained
unchanged until the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The intention of the statute was to include in the gross estate the
portion of the property that was traceable to an outlay of funds that
originally were the decedent's own, in order to prevent the evasion
of death transfer taxes on property passing by will or intestacy by
the use of common law property devices that could transfer property
outside the decedent's estate.' Although the statute has achieved
this objective, its operational effect has been to place a heavy bur-
den of proof on the surviving spouse to trace actual contributions.
As a result, spouses without adequately documented evidence of
contributions often fail to have their actual interest in the property
recognized for estate tax purposes.7 In the family business situation,
in which both spouses enter into marriage and the business with
little or no separate property, the entire value of the jointly owned
business and other jointly owned property arguably is attributable
to the energies and contributions of both spouses over the term of
the marriage. Inclusion of the full value of such properties in the
estate of the first to die is therefore inequitable.
CASE LAW DETERMINATION OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S
PROPORTIONATE INTEREST IN PROPERTY
ACQUIRED FROM RESOURCES OF THE FAMILY BUSINESS
To determine the degree of ownership in jointly held property for
purposes of death transfer taxation, a court initially must ascertain
the substantive form in which such property is held by the spouses.'
Courts have interpreted the federal estate tax concept of ownership
as determined by all the surrounding facts and circumstances, not
by the mere form of legal title evidencing ownership.' When the
5. The phrase "received or acquired from the decedent for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" and all other references to "adequate and full
consideration" were added by § 302(e) of the 1926 Revenue Act. Section 302(e) became §
811(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which became § 2040 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, all without substantive changes. See 2 MERrENs, LAW OF FEDERAL GiFr AND
ESTATE TAXATION § 15.01 (1959).
6. See Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S. 160 (1931); Estate of Peters v.
Comm'r, 386 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1967); Stuart v. Hassett, 41 F Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1941).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. See Hockey, Wife's Services May Avoid Inclusion of Jointly Held Property in Husband's
Estate, 34 J. TAX. 174 (1971).
9. See Estate of Ensley v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) % 77,402 (1977). In Ensley, the court
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joint owner-spouses have been able to prove the existence of a part-
nership agreement, the courts have not reached the question of the
applicability of section 2040 or its exception. In such cases, the
business property, along with all other properties acquired from
business earnings, is included in the decedent's estate according to
his proportionate interest in the de facto partnership.'0 When no
partnership agreement is found and the property is not held as
tenants in common or community property, courts apply the statu-
tory presumption of full inclusion in the decedent's gross estate."
The surviving spouse, usually the wife, then must trace the ade-
quate and fair considerations in money or money's worth that she
has contributed toward the purchase of the property in order to
exclude any portion of such property from her decedent husband's
estate.
The Partnership Theory
Five cases decided between 1940 and 197812 excluded one-half of
the value of business and most other property from the estate of the
first spouse to die under the partnership theory In Estate of Water-
man v. Commissioner,'3 the husband died holding legal title to all
properties in his name. The uncontradicted oral testimony of his
wife established that the couple entered into their forty-year mar-
riage with a nominal sum of separate property owned by the wife.
During the course of their marriage, they entered into a number of
business ventures in which both spouses took an active interest with
the oral understanding that each spouse would own one-half of the
businesses and that each would share equally in the success of their
ventures. All income was reported on the husband's separate income
stated that "the Federal estate tax concept of ownership under section 2040 looks to the source
of the consideration represented by the property and disregards legal title." Id. at 77-1625.
10. United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1952); Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1944); Craig v. United
States, 451 F Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978); Estate of Waterman v. Comm'r, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H)
40,519 (1940).
11. Berkowitz v. Comm'r, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Estate of Ensley v. Comm'r, 46
T.C.M. (P-H) 77,402 (1977); Estate of Ehret v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,315 (1976);
Estate of Otte v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,076 (1972); Estate of Trafton v. Comm'r,
27 T.C. 610 (1956), acq. at 1957-1 C.B. 5; Estate of Awrey v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 222 (1945);
Estate of Fletcher v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 429 (1941).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 40,519 (1940).
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tax returns in which the decedent frequently referred to the proper-
ties as "our" and used the term "we" in his explanations attached
thereto. Although the Board of Tax Appeals noted that separate
income tax returns were not filed by the wife, it concluded that the
wife's oral testimony was sufficient to overcome the statutory pre-
sumption of full inclusion in the husband's gross estate and held
that the wife "had, at the decedent's death, a one-half interest in
all his assets derived from the payment of full consideration there-
for." 4 In response to the Commissioner's contention that local law
precluded either spouse from recovering any compensation for labor
performed for the other, the court further found that "the spouses
(were) working for themselves-treating the ventures as joint ven-
tures. They did not act as principal and agent or employer and
employee; they were, in a liberal sense of the word, partners." '' 5
In Rogan v. Kammerdiner,'6 the government defeated the tax-
payer by using the "partnership" theory to its advantage, thereby
including one-half of the husband's separate property transferred to
himself and his wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship in
the estate of his wife. The husband, as the surviving joint tenant,
claimed the entire property but insisted that the half interest vest-
ing in him as the survivor of the joint tenancy was not taxable as
part of his wife's estate for federal tax purposes because the property
originally belonged to him and that he gave her the property for no
consideration; therefore, when he later acquired it as her survivor,
it was not taxable under section 302(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926.'7
14. Id. at 40-843.
15. Id.
16. 140 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1944).
17. The statute stated:
Sec. 302 [as amended by Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 404, 48 Stat. 680].
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside the United
States.
(e) To the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent
and any other person or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse,
or deposited, with any person carrying on the banking business, in their joint
names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may
be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have
been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302, 44 Stat. 9 (1926). See note 5 supra.
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After reviewing an agreement "to divide 50-50, win or lose"'" the
proceeds of an oil tool recovery business and the separate income tax
returns filed by husband and wife as partners, the court agreed with
the Commissioner's determination that a tax was due on the wife's
half interest in the property held in joint tenancy with right of
survivorship. The court relied heavily upon the husband's testimony
that at the time of their marriage it was agreed that all property
derived from their labors should be held in joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship.'9 The court did not determine the wife's mate-
rial participation in the business or capital contributions.
The controversy in Singer v. Shaughnessy 20 centered on the sur-
viving wife's relationship to a small publishing company which the
husband originally purchased and operated two years before the
marriage; the wife took an active part in the conduct of the business
during the subsequent eighteen years of their marriage. The facts
revealed that the wife was primarily responsible for the operation
of the business during the early years of the marriage while the
husband worked as a salesman for a book publishing company
Some time later, the husband left his job and joined the wife. Three
months before his death, the husband executed a formal partner-
ship agreement with his wife in which he sold her a one-half undi-
vided interest. Other evidence, however, showed that both husband
and wife understood that from the time the wife became associated
with the business following her marriage she was to be a joint owner
of the enterprise. In the district court 1 the jury found that a partner-
ship existed from the date of the marriage. Affirming the jury's
determination of fact on conflicting evidence, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated: "Since all the property held in their
joint names was purchased with funds earned by them together and
withdrawn from the business, it follows that only one half of the
value of such property was includible in the decedent's gross es-
tate. 22 This decision is unique because the district court jury de-
cided in favor of the wife's contention that a partnership agreement
existed from the date of the marriage despite evidence showing that
no partnership returns were filed until after execution of the part-
18. 140 F.2d at 571.
19. Id.
20. 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
21. 96 F Supp. 506 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).
22. 198 F.2d at 181.
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nership agreement; separate income tax returns were filed by the
wife for six years in which she received a salary from the business;
confidential bank statements revealed that the husband listed him-
self as the sole owner of the business; and the subsequent partner-
ship agreement itself denied any prior ownership by the wife.3
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Neel" articulated
the best definition of a partnership for federal estate tax purposes.
The case involved a fact pattern similar to that stated above in that
the spouses participated together in a number of businesses during
the marriage which accounted for almost all of their accumulated
joint wealth, the "classic family business" case. At the time of his
death, the husband held most of the properties in his name. No
evidence of income tax returns filed separately existed, and most of
the factual evidence was established by the wife's testimony. The
court affirmed the district court's holding that a general partnership
existed and that only one-half of the property was therefore mcludi-
ble in the decedent's estate. In its opinion, the court stated that "a
partnership is created by persons joining together their money,
goods, labor or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, business,
or profession, when there is a community of interest in the profits
and losses." Although courts will scrutinize closely a family ar-
rangement, the absence of a formal agreement is not determinative:
"Each case must rest on its own facts, but in determining the intent
of the parties, the court will look at what the parties actually did to
effectuate their avowed intentions. 120 Therefore, a partnership
agreement even may be implied from the parties' conduct.
The most recent of the family partnership cases, Craig v. United
States, 2 was decided by the United States District Court for South
Dakota in 1978. This case involved a dispute over the ownership of
a farm personalty which the Commissioner contended was fully
includible in the husband's gross estate. The evidence showed that
both spouses had entered into marriage with only nominal assets
and had built a sizeable farming operation over a period of forty-
three years. Based on evidence of capital contributions by both
23. 96 F Supp. at 508.
24. 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956).
25. Id. at 399.
26. Id. at 400, citing Eckhard v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 547, 549 (10th Cir. 1950).
27. 451 F Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978).
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parties, division of labor, arduous physical contributions by both
parties in the operation of the farm, and equal participation by the
spouses in all major decisions of the business, the court found that
a family partnership did exist and that only one-half of the farm
personalty was included in the husband's gross estate. The court did
not consider the manner in which income tax returns were filed.
From these cases, it appears that whenever the court finds a part-
nership business relationship based upon equal capital contribu-
tions and services of both spouses, some, usually one-half, of the
business property and any other property acquired with the pro-
ceeds of the business will be excluded from the estate of the first to
die regardless of how the parties held legal title. The taxpayer thus
avoids the burdensome "consideration furnished" and tracing tests
required to invoke the exception to full inclusion in section 2040(a)
The partnership argument, however, is not the panacea for all
family businesses. The determination of whether such a business
relationship was a de facto partnership is a question of fact, and
different courts undoubtedly will assign differing weights to the
factual elements. To the extent that uncertainty exists for each
factual situation, taxpayers have little guidance in showing that a
partnership existed without testing their individual fact patterns in
court.
The Section 2040(a) "Consideration Furnished" Exception
If the partnership argument fails or is inapplicable, the surviving
spouse is confronted with section 2040's presumption of full inclu-
sion, unless the spouse can trace into the property in question an
adequate consideration in money or money's worth. In the eight
cases in which the wife has shown material participation in a family
business setting by the performance of non-domestic services and
the existence of an agreement with her husband to share the profits
of the business or ownership of assets purchased with such profits,
the courts have allowed at least a partial exclusion of assets from
her husband's gross estate.2" This judicial doctrine was first enunci-
28. Berkowitz v. Comm'r, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Estate of Ensley v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 77,402 (1977); Estate
of Ehret v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,315 (1976); Estate of Trafton v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.
610 (1956), acq. at 1957-1 C.B. 5; Estate of Giuliani v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (P-H) 52,207 (1952);
Estate of Porteous v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M. (P-H) 42,557 (1942); Estate of Fletcher v. Comm'r,
44 B.T.A. 429 (1941).
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ated by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in
Richardson v. Helvering.9 The evidence showed that the wife had
given her husband certain separate property and salaries paid to her
from the husband's business in order that the husband might invest
in parcels of real estate, with the understanding that "if the money
invested 'came back,' it would come back to both of them."3 Based
on this oral agreement and prbof of the amount contributed to the
husband, the court rejected the Commissioner's contention that
exact tracing of the funds from property to property was required
and held that only one-half of the investment property was includi-
ble in the husband's gross estate.' In dictum, the court further
stated that because the wife was entitled to and could have com-
pelled recognition of her right to an equal interest m the property,
such property was subject to her claims, and the statutory exception
was met.3"
Berkowitz v. Commissioner' resembled the classic family busi-
ness relationship more closely than Richardson v. Helvering. Here,
the husband and wife started a retail grocery business with equal
contributions of $150.00 and for forty-three years devoted all their
skill and labor to operating the store. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the lower court's determination that failure
to prove the existence of a partnership agreement resulted in the full
inclusion of jointly held properties in the husband's estate. The
Third Circuit held that while profit sharing might be an attribute
of a partnership relationship, profits can be, and often are, shared
by persons who are not partners. 3' The court stated: "The control-
ling question is whether the profits are those of the petitioner,
and not how they are characterized . "35 Finding a genuine
agreement to share profits, free of any scheme of tax avoidance
29. 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
30. Id. at 549.
31. Accord, Estate of Porteous v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M. (P-H) 42,557 (1942).
32. Note, however, that in common law jurisdictions that do not recognize the wife's right
to profits from jointly held property, a Richardson argument might not prevail. See General
Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13,511, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
287 (Comm. Print 1979) (prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation); S. RE'.
No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6761, 6978.
33. 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939).
34. Id. at 321.
35. Id.
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(because of the wife's contribution of capital and material participa-
tion), the court excluded one-half of the property from the hus-
band's estate."'
In another "family store" case, Estate of Trafton v
Commissioner ' 7 the Tax Court was confronted with an oral agree-
ment between husband and wife that subsequent to their marriage,
"whatever was earned or accumulated through their joint efforts
was to belong to them jointly "3 In this case, the spouses married
when the decedent had a one-half interest in a drugstore. Later,
they borrowed money from the wife's father and bought out the
other half interest. The wife worked in the store for eight years,
while the loan was paid off and other properties were acquired with
the proceeds of the business. To effectuate the agreement, the dece-
dent transfered and purchased securities in their joint names.
Finding that the wife had provided capital and actively partici-
pated in the business, the Tax Court held that she had contrib-
uted money's worth consideration toward txle transfer and pur-
chase of the securities and was entitled to an exclusion of one-half
of their value from the husband's estate.39
While these cases demonstrate the effectiveness of a profit sharing
agreement for purposes of tax recognition of a wife's one-half inter-
est in joint properties, not all surviving spouses have experienced a
like degree of success. In Estate of Ehret v. Commissioner," the
court found an oral agreement between the spouses to "pool their
efforts to make their marriage successful,"'" but the wife was only
partially successful in excluding jointly owned property from her
husband's estate. An explanation for this result may be the variance
of the facts in this case from those in the more classic family busi-
36. Accord, Estate of Giuliam v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.M. (P-H) T 52,207 (1952). In this case,
one-half of the value of a jointly owned and operated store was excluded from the husband's
estate because the court found "substantial evidence to support [a] finding that decedent
and his wife agreed that she should have a one-half interest in the business and property."
Id. at 52-608.
37. 27 T.C. 610 (1956).
38. Id. at 612.
39. Accord, Estate of Fletcher v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 429 (1941). The facts of this case were
almost identical to those m Trafton, except that the spouses agreed to an oral partition of
property just before the husband's death. The court found that the wife's contributions of
capital and services were adequate consideration for the agreement and excluded the wife's
share of property under the agreement from her husband's gross estate.
40. 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76,315 (1976).
41. Id. at 76-1409.
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ness cases discussed above. Instead of the husband and wife starting
and developing a business, this case involved a business which the
wife's in-laws had established years before the marriage. Rather
than providing services from the inception of the marriage in an
equal capacity with the husband, the wife worked as a salaried
employee during only the last eight years of a forty-year marriage.
On these facts, the Commissioner excluded twenty percent of the
value of jointly owned properties purchased after the wife became
a salaried employee. The Tax Court noted that the wife was fortun-
ate to obtain that much because she could not trace her salary into
any of the jointly owned property
In Estate of Ensley v. Commissioner,4" the wife assumed opera-
tional control over a business already owned by her husband. From
the evidence presented, the Tax Court concluded that her services
were at least equal in value to those of the husband and were ren-
dered pursuant to an agreement to share profits. But the court also
found that almost all of the consideration furnished for the purchase
of jointly held assets was traceable to the husband's large pre-
marital estate. This situation is clearly distinguishable from classic
family business cases, which typically involve a husband and wife
entering into the marriage with assets of nominal value. In addition,
the business in which the wife participated was not profitable until
the two years immediately prior to the husband's death, so few
profits were available for contribution to jointly held property The
Tax Court held that unless the exact tracing requirements could be
met, the statutory presumption of full inclusion could not be over-
come. Nonetheless, the court did arrive at a small estimated
amount of the wife's profits for the last two years, less living expen-
ses, which was excluded from the husband's estate.43 Ehret and
Ensley suggest that an oral profit sharing agreement is most effec-
tive in excluding property from the husband's estate when com-
42. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 77,402 (1977).
43. See also Estate of Bruderman v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 560 (1948). In this case, the wife
asserted an oral agreement entered into at the time of the marriage, wherein husband and
wife would hold all after-acquired properties as tenants in common. All properties arose from
the efforts and earnings of her decedent husband; the widow neither rendered services nor
invested her separate property. The Tax Court held that a mere agreement, without more,
was insufficient to satisfy the test of adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth where the property is traceable to the decedent or his efforts. Accord, Estate of Love-
land v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 5 (1949) (wife's services in the home not recognized as consideration
furnished for jointly held property).
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bined with factual findings that all jointly held assets resulted from
the earnings of family businesses which were started from scratch
and in which the wife materially participated from the time of the
marriage until her husband's demise (i.e., the classic family busi-
ness case)
Three cases, with differing results, have been decided in which
the courts have not expressly found a partnership business relation-
ship or an agreement to share profits."
In Bushman v. United States," the wife contended that a portion
of the value of jointly held real estate should be excluded from her
husband's estate because of money's worth consideration furnished
by her in the form of services provided in managing family real
estate investments and performing clerical duties for her husband's
law practice. Because the wife could not show any form of inter-
spousal agreement or salary paid, the court concluded that her serv-
ices were never considered, valued, or estimated by either the dece-
dent or the wife during the more than four decades of their married
life. The court acknowledged that such services may have been of
inestimable value to the husband but held that the only compensa-
tion in her mind was the love and affection of her husband. 46
In Estate of Awrey v Commissioner,47 the husband and wife
started from scratch and worked together intermittently in a bakery
business for the first twenty years of the marriage. The wife demon-
strated material participation and capital contributions to the busi-
ness for this twenty-year period but was unable to prove a partner-
ship or profit sharing agreement. During the second twenty years of
marriage, the wife took no part in the business, and it was during
this period that the business experienced the bulk of its growth.
The wife was never paid for her services nor did she ever file an
income tax return. The court held that the wife's contribution of
capital and services in the early years of the business "is not suffi-
cient basis for considering the wife as owner of an interest in her
husband's partnership interest, but is rather to be ascribed to her
general interest as a wife in the family welfare. ' 48 The court noted
44. Estate of Otte v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,076 (1972); Estate of Awrey v.
Comm'r, 5 T.C. 222 (1945); Bushman v. United States, 8 F Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
45. 8 F Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934). See also Estate of Silvester v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (P-H)
77,439 (1977) (property fully includible in husband's gross estdte because of wife's failure
to prove profit sharing agreement, mutual efforts, and a pooling of resources).
46. 8 F Supp. at 698.
47. 5 T.C. 222 (1945).
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that a finding that the wife was the owner of such a large capital
interest would be unsupportable because the business she left was
worth only a small amount compared to its value at her husband's
death.
The Tax Court decided Estate of Otte v. Commissioner49 in favor
of the wife even though the facts showed neither a partnership nor
a profit sharing agreement. In many other respects, however, the
case was similar to the classic family business case. The husband
and wife entered into marriage with few assets and worked together
"as a 'husband and wife team,' each [contributing] their services
in managing and operating their farming enterprise."5 They pooled
all of their earnings and virtually all of the real and personal prop-
erty purchased during the marriage was acquired with these earn-
ings. Because all assets were purchased from joint funds, the court
rejected the strict tracing requirement test, held that the wife's
contributions represented an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, and excluded one-half of the value of all
property from the husband's gross estate.
The cases discussed above lead to the conclusion that courts have
recognized a wife's services in the family business as money's worth
consideration whenever the facts show the main elements of the
classic family business case. Variations from the standard fact pat-
tern have led some courts to disregard the value of services ren-
dered. But those surviving spouses who have shown a material par-
ticipation in the growth and prosperity of the family business pur-
suant to an agreement, either express or implied, to form a business
partnership or share in the profits of the business have obtained
relief from taxation in the estates of their deceased spouses.
THE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN EXISTING STATUTORY LAW TO GivE
RECOGNITION TO THE WIFE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FAMILY BUSINESS
Although the original justification for federal estate taxation was
the necessity of raising revenue, the current rationale is to "prevent
or moderate the unreasonable accumulation of wealth and its trans-
mission from generation to generation."'5 The transfer of a reasona-
48. Id. at 239.
49. 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,076 (1972).
50. Id. at 72-318.
51. Estate and Gift Tax Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings] (March 22, 1976) (statement
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ble inheritance to one's spouse and children has been recognized as
a necessary incentive to encourage full utilization of individual pro-
ductive resources.2 Underlying the application of the federal estate
tax statutes is the notion of horizontal equity In the case of the
family business, horizontal equity means equal application of the
statutes to both spouses, equality of treatment between residents of
different states (community property versus common law states),
and equality of treatment between those couples who can afford
estate tax avoidance advice and those who cannot. As inflation
caused an increasing number of moderate estates to be subject to
taxation, the pressures for estate tax reform incorporating these
objectives became greater.53 Finally, in 1976, Congress was forced to
re-evaluate laws which had remained fundamentally unchanged
since the 1940's.54 Congress enacted new statutes and amended old
ones in order to achieve some degree of congruity between the estate
tax policy objectives and the actual operation of the statutes.
To understand and evaluate the various proposals for reform, a
review of the pre-1976 status of estate tax laws having the most
direct impact on family businesses is necessary
As noted earlier, section 2040's predecessor appeared with the
first estate tax laws in 1916.11 At that time, there was no gift tax
statute. Therefore, the transfer tax on estates could be avoided en-
tirely by making gifts which would take effect at death, leaving the
decedent with nothing in his estate to pass by will or intestacy Had
Congress omitted the predecessor of section 2040, a taxpayer could
have avoided estate taxes completely by inter vivos transfer of all
properties into joint tenancy with the spouse or someone else while
simultaneously maintaining absolute control over at least one-half
of the property during his lifetime. In the case of spouses holding
as tenants by the entirety, the transferor spouse could maintain full
lifetime control.
Without regard to the propriety of taxing transfers between
of William E. Simon, Sec. of Treas., presented by Charles W Walker, Ass't Sec. of Treas.
for Tax Policy).
52. See Eisenstem, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 229 (1956),
quoting 17 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 432-34 (memorial ed. 1925).
53. See notes 64-95 infra & accompanying text.
54. 1976 Hearings, supra note 51, at 1 (statement of William E. Simon, Sec. of Trees.,
presented by Charles W Walker, Ass't Sec. of Treas. for Tax Policy).
55. See notes 2-4 supra & accompanying text.
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spouses,5 the Revenue Act of 1916 closed this obvious loophole in
the law through use of the statutory presumption of full inclusion
of jointly held property in the estate of the first to die. In 1924
Congress enacted the first gift tax statute, 57 which the Treasury
Department interpreted as imposing a transfer tax applicable to the
creation of joint tenancies.58 Nothing was done to coordinate the
estate tax statute on joint tenancies with the gift tax interpretation
of the Treasury The result was that one spouse could make a gift
to the other of an interest in entirety property, pay the gift tax, and
still be subject to full inclusion of the entirety property in his estate
at death. Although the statute did provide a credit to the estate for
gift taxes paid, the net effect of the gift and estate taxes was to deny
spouses any method of avoidance of transfer taxation on the appre-
ciation in value of the properties from the time of the gift. The gift
tax on creation of joint tenancies also had an interesting corollary
effect in operation: it was overwhelmingly disregarded, presumably
as a result of ignorance of its existence, by persons making lifetime
transfers in joint tenancy Such a huge number of estates were delin-
quent in filing a return and paying tax on the creation of a joint
tenancy that Congress made the gift tax section elective in 1954.51
Thus, the lack of awareness of a gift tax and the impotency of the
completed gift in reducing transfer taxes on appreciation in value
made it unwise for spouses conscious of estate tax consequences to
hold property in this form. Unfortunately, this operation of the stat-
ute was known to only a few The vast majority of spouses in com-
mon law states continued to hold property in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety 60
As an adjunct to and possibly in mitigation of the harsh results
56. Only recently has this topic come to the forefront in tax reform proposals. See ALI,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation Recommendations and Reporter's Studies 32-3 (1969); Tax
Reform Studies and Proposals, U.S. Treas. Dept., House Comm. on Ways and Means and
Senate Comm. on Finance, Joint Publication, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 358 (Comm.
Print 1969).
57. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-24, 43 Stat. 253.
58. U.S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(2), 19(8) (1939).
59. See I.R.C. § 2515(a).
60. See Campfield, Estate Planning for Joint Tenancies, 1974 DUKE L.J. 669, 671 n.3
(discussion of non-tax advantages of joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Hines, Real
Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and Fancy, 51 IowA L. REv. 582 (1966) (popularity of
joint ownership as a fairly recent phenomenon developing since the 1930s); Riecker, Joint
Tenancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64 MICH. L. REv. 801 (1966) (popularity
of joint tenancies may be due to encouragement by lawyers).
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extracted by the joint tenancy statutes on transfers between
spouses, Congress, in 1948, enacted the estate and gift tax marital
deductions.6 ' The legislative purpose of the marital deduction was
the equalization of tax treatment of couples in common law and
community property states . 2 Community property states automati-
cally attributed all property acquired after the marriage, except by
gift, bequest, or devise to an individual spouse, as belonging one-
half to each spouse under the theory that each spouse has contrib-
uted equally to the marriage. Surviving spouses in such jurisdictions
were given automatic recognition of their contributions, in whatever
form, toward building the marital estate. Unfortunately, such was
not the case in common law states, the laws of which found their
origin in an era when women were not recognized as legally compe-
tent to hold property Though the stated objective of the marital
deduction was equalization of tax treatment, the operative result
was to recognize the contributions of spouses in common law states
by excluding one-half of the marital property left to such spouses
from the taxable estate of the first spouse to die. This result was
largely disregarded by those reformers who sought changes in sec-
tion 2040, as well as by the courts in post-1948 decisions recognizing
the exclusion of portions of jointly held property from the husband's
estate before application of the marital deduction. Thus, any recog-
nition of jointly held property as belonging to the surviving spouse
apparently operated to duplicate the effect of the marital deduction.
For example, if the wife were successful in arguing for exclusion of
one-half of jointly owned property from the estate of her husband
and were allowed a fifty percent marital deduction on-the one-half
left in his estate, the net effect was to recognize only twenty-five
percent of the value of the property as being owned by him at death.
The only policy justification for such a result was the view, held by
many, that interspousal transfers, whether during life or at death,
should be totally exempt from taxation, that is, a 100% marital
deduction. 3
61. Revenue Act of 1948 ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110, reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 211, 216-20.
62. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 241; S. REP.
No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess..1 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 285.
63. Since 1969, both the Treasury Department and the American Law Institute have advo-
cated the total abolition of taxation on interspousal transfer. See ALI, Federal Estate and
Gift Taxation Recommendations and Reporter's Studies 32-33 (1969); Tax Reform Studies
and Proposals, U.S. Treas. Dept., House Comm. on Ways and Means and Sen. Comm. on
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Substantive reform of estate and gift tax statutes relating to the
family business began with the American Law Institute Recommen-
dations" and the Department of Treasury proposals6 5 for tax reform
in 1969. These studies recommended the complete elimination of
taxation on interspousal transfers whether property was passed to
a spouse inter vivos or at death. Such a measure, it was felt, would
simplify the tax laws while simultaneously providing equality of
treatment to all surviving spouses." The effect of a 100% marital
deduction on the jointly held family business is clear. As between
spouses, the operation of section 2040 would have no application
and the entire subject matter of this Article would be relegated to
its place in tax history 67
The 1976 Department of Treasury proposals also clearly outlined
why the laws were in need of reform. Citing statistical data collected
by the Treasury Department, the proposal noted that in the thirty
years between 1945 and 1975, the percentage of estates required to
Finance, Joint Publication, 91st Cong., ist Sess., pt. 3, at 358 (Comm. Pnnt 1969); Hearings
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on Tax Reform, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 4038
(March 27, 1969) (statement of Earl M. Colson).
64. ALI, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation Recommendations and Reporter's Studies
(1969).
65. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, U.S. Tress. Dept., House Comm. on Ways and
Means and Senate Comm. on Finance, Joint Publication, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (Comm.
Print 1969).
66. The American Law Institute gave five reasons for dissatisfaction with the 50% limit:
First, it does not achieve complete equality of tax treatment as between com-
munity and noncommunity property states because the marital deduction for
lifetime transfers is limited to 50% of the value of each gift to the donee spouse;
Second, it still results in the imposition of a transfer tax on the movement of
property from spouse to spouse and forces them into an unnatural recordkeeping
of interspousal transfers if the law is to be complied with; Third, frequently the
tax that has to be paid as a result of an interspousal transfer comes at the death
of a spouse, a time when significant sources of income may disappear, and hence
not a time when a further economic adjustment should be required to pay taxes
on the transfer; Fourth, very complex dispositions are necessary to give the
surviving spouse on the donor spouse's death the exact 50% that is the maxi-
mum marital deduction; and Fifth, in small estates, the 50% marital deduction
is frequently inadequate to provide the surviving spouse with an adequate tax
free amount.
ALI, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation Recommendations and Reporter's Studies 32-33
(1969) (footnote omitted).
67. It is interesting to note that these proposals did not die with the 1960's but were re-
introduced by the Treasury Department as proposals for tax revisions in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976. 1976 Heanngs, supra note 51, at 9-11 (statement of William E. Simon, Sec. of Treas.,
presented by Charles W Walker, Ass't Sec. of Tress. for Tax Policy).
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file returns increased from approximately one percent to just over
eleven percent of all estates. 8 The proposal noted that the effect of
this increase was a "ten-fold increase in the impact of the estate tax
in terms of the percentage of estates affected. No longer does the tax
impact principally on the relatively larger estates. Rather, the es-
tate tax has shifted to a more broadly-based tax on the private
capital accumulations of more moderate estates."" Reiterating the
policy objectives of the estate tax, the proposal further stated that:
[T]he estate tax has the limited function of restraining the
undue accumulation of wealth. It should not be viewed as a de-
vice to raise revenue nor to achieve progressivity in the tax sys-
tem, per se. It is inappropriate, therefore, to continue down
the present path to a broad-based estate tax that imposes heavy
burdens on moderate estates at a time when financial demands
on the widow and children of a decedent may be most heavy and
when the chief revenue producer has been lost to the family 10
The impact of estate taxation and its policy objectives on the
family business was placed even more clearly in perspective by wit-
nesses who appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee.
Setting the tax policy considerations in the framework of the family
business, Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin stated:
The ultimate question posed by estate tax policy is whether the
country wishes to preserve a climate where family enterprise can
survive a transfer from one generation to another, or whether we
are going to destroy most existing family firms and weaken the
incentive to establish new ones by continuing the present limita-
tions.71
Testifying on the confiscatory nature of the tax, Alice Heyman,
appearing on behalf of the National Women's Political Caucus
noted that:
In recent years I have become distressed by the steady decrease
in small family-owned businesses as well as the decline in
the number of family farms
Simply stated, the gradual but nonetheless steady disappear-
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2 (statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson).
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ance of the family farm and other small businesses has been
fostered by high estate taxes, which leaves the wife as heir and
after payment of the estate tax-often through the sale of part of
the farm-with a farming unit that is often not economically
viable and one that is eventually sold. In many situations, the
wife is actually forced to sell the farm or the small business in
order to secure the necessary funds to pay the applicable tax.7 2
Though the witnesses were decidedly m agreement on the
discriminatory effect of the estate tax on the surviving widow of the
joint family enterprise, 3 recommendations for a solution to the
problem divided them into two groups. The first group, in alignment
with the proposals of the Treasury Department and the American
Law Institute," advocated the recognition of the wife's services and
relief from the "widow's tax"75 through an increase in the estate tax
marital deduction. The second group, focusing on the immediate
source of their concern, advocated an amendment to section 2040 to
eliminate either the consideration furnished test or to recognize the
wife's contributions of services as money's worth consideration to
satisfy the test.
72. Public Hearings & Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways & Means on the
General Subject of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 918 (1976)
(statement of Alice Heyman).
73. Illustrative of the vehemence of women testifying on the discriminatory effect of the
Service's application of § 2040 is a quote from the letter of a Wisconsin woman:
Some of my points are: 1. When property is owned jointly - yet a wife must
pay inheritance tax on both halves, she is denied the right to own property. 2.
Taxes are paid by joint return therefore she has already paid the tax on her half
of income - how can she inherit what is already hers? 3. If labor is not a
contribution then her husband's labor should not count either. If his does, then
this constitutes slavery. Slavery was abolished in 1865, therefore the law is
illegal.
Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Comm. on Finance (Part 4 of 4), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 156
(1976); 1976 Hearings, supra note 51, at 156 (March 17, 1976) (quotes from letters received
by Mrs. Lloyd Royal on estate taxation).
74. See notes 63-66 supra & accompanying text.
75. The phrase "widow's tax" was first coined by Ms. Laura Lane in an article appearing
in the September, 1975 Farm Journal, entitled Let's Get Rid of the Widow's Tax. In this
article, Ms. Lane explains the application of the § 2040 statutory presumption by I.R.S.
agents who refused to recognize a wife's contributions of labor on the farm as money's worth
consideration. She concludes by urging readers to support a Nebraska campaign led by Doris
Royal and three other women to "get rid of the widow's tax." From this article and the efforts
of Mrs. Royal, the campaign spread across the entire United States with petitions gathered
from 48 states for presentation to Congress. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 51, at 165-68
(March 17, 1976).
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Curiously, the group advocating an increase in the marital deduc-
tion to recognize the spouse's contributions did not lobby for the
total abolition of interspousal transfer taxes; rather, this group con-
fined its request to the enactment of a 100% marital deduction up
to the $100,000-$250,000 level, with the fifty percent rule applying
thereafter. Representative of the reasoning of this group was the
statement of the American Farm Bureau Federation which recom-
mended:
a substantial increase in the marital deduction to minimize the
problem of the so-called "widow's tax" [by raising] the
maximum marital deduction from 50 percent of the value of the
adjusted gross estate passed to a surviving spouse to $100,000
plus 50 percent of the total value of the adjusted gross estate.
This would recognize the importance of partnerships between
husbands and wives, and the special problems of wives who are
widowed at an early age.76
Similar proposals were advocated by the National Farmer's
Union," the United Farm Wives of America, 8 and Senator Gaylord
Nelson in his introduction of Senate Bill 2819 on the floor of the
Senate. 9 The emphasis on an increased marital deduction by this
group seems to confirm the writer's earlier hypothesis that relief for
surviving spouses in common law states historically has been tied
to the marital deduction, which applies to the common law states
the community property notion of marital property being owned
equally by both spouses. 0 The efforts of this group were ultimately
recognized in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which allowed a 100%
marital deduction up to $250,000, with the fifty percent rule apply-
76. 1976 Heanngs, supra note 51, at 165-68 (March 17, 1976) (statement of the American
Farm Bureau Federation, presented by Allan Grant, President).
77. Public Hearings & Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways & Means on the
General Subject of Federal Estate & Gift Taxes, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 970-72 (1976)
(proposing a 100% marital deduction up to $240,000).
78. Id. at 1709 (proposing a 100% marital deduction up to $100,000 with the 50% limit
applicable thereafter).
79. 121 CONG. REc. 41526 (1975) (proposing a transfer of the first $240,000 df business and
other property to a surviving spouse free of tax at death). It is interesting to note that while
Senator Nelson began his campaign against the widow's tax by recommending an increased
marital deduction, he was ultimately responsible for enactment of the § 2040(c) amendment
in the Revenue Act of 1978. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
80. See notes 61-63 supra & accompanying text.
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Ing thereafter."' It would seem, then, that this would have settled
the issue of the "widow's tax." Such was not the case, however, as
the second group ultimately prevailed on its proposals as well.2
Spearheaded by the efforts of Doris Royal and an article in the
September 1975 issue of the Farm Journal," the second group lob-
bied for a direct amendment to section 2040 which would recogmnze
the wife's contributions of service to the family business as money's
worth consideration. No mention was made of the recent case law
in favor of spouses who materially participated in the business.,,
This group focused its attention on the law as applied by revenue
agents in the field. In answer to the question whether a wife contrib-
uted by driving a tractor, sorting cattle, and doing the book work,
one Internal Revenue Service attorney replied that "[t]he wife
renders all these services as a part of her marriage contract, ''5
implying that such services are not money's worth consideration
furnished for jointly held property Alice Heyman, speaking on be-
half of the National Women's Political Caucus, blasted the Internal
Revenue Service, stating:
While the Internal Revenue Code may not contain any flagrant
de jure discriminatory provisions, it is, nevertheless, the NWPC's
position that the application of those provisions or certain regula-
tions, as well as the application of IRS regulations by its revenue
agents across the country, operates, in fact, as de facto discrimi-
nation against women who have significantly contributed to the
economic and financial well-being of their families. [Sluch
discriminatory application of the IRS Code and regulations is as
reprehensible as if the tax laws contained specific provisions
mandating that an inordinate tax burden be placed not merely
on women as a class, but particularly widows left to manage small
farms in the Midwest and small businesses, such as the tradi-
tional "Mom and Pop" grocery stores. 86
81. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1854 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 2056(c)(1)(A)).
82. See notes 97-114 mfra & accompanying text.
83. See note 75 supra.
84. See notes 8-50 supra & accompanying text.
85. Public Hearings & Panel Discussions before the Comm. on Ways and Means on the
General Subject of Federal Estate & Gift Taxes, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 823 (1976),
citing Farm Journal, September 1975.
86. Id., pt. 2, at 918.
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Recommendations by this group included repeal of the presump-
tion against equal contributions, the establishment of a presump-
tion. in favor of the contributing wife, and amendatory legislation
specifically recognizing a wife's contributions as money's worth con-
sideration. Major political groups favoring one or more of the above
proposals included American Agri-Women, 87 National Organization
for Women,88 Women's Lobby, 9 National Women's Political Cau-
cus,"0 National Livestock Tax Committee," American National Cat-
tlemen's Association,9 2 National Livestock Feeder's Association, 3
and the National Wool Growers Association. 4 Relief in the form of
amendatory legislation recognizing the wife's material participation
as consideration furnished was finally granted in the Revenue Act
of 1978.15
From the analysis of the lobbying positions of these two groups,
both of which sought the same objective-namely, recognition of the
wife's contribution to the marital estate-it appears that relief was
granted twice, once in the 1976 Act and again in the 1978 Act. Three
possible explanations can be offered. First, the Congress may not
have considered the relief granted to widows by the increased mari-
tal deduction sufficient to eliminate the problem and wished to
confine any further relief to widows who were co-owners in family
businesses, as opposed to granting an across-the-board increase in
the marital deduction. A second explanation is that Congress at last
was moving toward the American Law Institute and Treasury De-
partment proposal of a 100% marital deduction. A third possibility
is that Congress never even considered the 2040 amendment as an
increased marital deduction, but rather as a provision to equalize
the tax treatment between family businesses organized as partner-
ships or corporations and those with no formal business entity Per-
87. Id., pt. 1, at 789.
88. Id., pt. 2, at 861.
89. Id. at 915.
90. Id. at 917. This group advocated the total elimination of tax on interspousal transfers
and in the alternative, requested recognition of the value of services performed by the spouse.
91. 1976 Hearings, supra note 51, at 165 (Joint Statement of Nat'l Livestock Tax Comm.,





95. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2821 (codified as I.R.C. §
2040(c)).
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haps Congress felt that the amendment would recognize the sub-
stance over form economic fact of the husband-wife partnership.
The committee reports lend support to the latter conclusion. 6
THE ORIGIN AND OPERATION OF THE SECTION 2040(c) AMENDMENT
The 1978 Internal Revenue Code amendment securmg final relief
from the widow's tax 7 came through the efforts of Senator Gaylord
Nelson of Wisconsin, who, in 1976, had supported an increased mar-
ital deduction to recognize the contribution of the surviving spouse
to the family business." On April 10, 1978, Senator Nelson intro-
duced Senate Bill 286511 as a floor amendment to the Internal Reve-
nue Code to "provide a more equitable estate tax treatment of joint
interests in farm and closely held business property "I" In his state-
ment on the Senate floor, Senator Nelson explained the operation
of his proposal:
In the event of death of a husband or wife who is a joint owner of
property, and who has been working a farm jointly with his or her
spouse, this proposal would deem the survivor, for estate tax
purposes, to have "furnished consideration" for their joint prop-
erty at the rate of 2 percent a year, up to a maximum of 50
percent of the portion of the property which has not been pard
for at the time of the marriage."'
In effect, this meant that the surviving contributing spouse could
"earn out" up to one-half of the amount of any "unpaid mortgages
on, or any indebtedness in respect of '"' the property existing at the
time the joint tenancy was created. The surviving spouse would not
be permitted to earn out any consideration furnished as a down
payment by the deceased spouse. Thus, if the deceased spouse made
fifty percent down payment, the surviving spouse would be permit-
ted to "earn out" a maximum of one-half of the remaining fifty
96. General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13,511, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (Comm. Print 1979) (prepared by the staff of the Joint Comm. on
Taxation); S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 214, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6977-78.
97. See note 75 supra & accompanying text.
98. See note 79 supra & accompanying text.
99. S. 2865, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S5188 (daily ed. April 10, 1978).
100. 124 CONG. REc. at S5190 (statement by Senator Nelson).
101. Id. (emphasis supplied).
102. Id. at S5191.
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
percent. If one of the spouses inherited the property unencumbered,
no earn out would be permitted. The bill dealt only with earning out
a portion of the mortgage indebtedness. No recognition was given
to the wife for appreciation in value on her earned out percentage
of the indebtedness. Apparently, this would leave the wife with an
exclusion that equaled only her earned out portion of the original
debt.'03
In explaining the reasons for this amendment, the Senator ap-
pears to have relied heavily upon the tax policy argument of hori-
zontal equity He argued that the distinction drawn by the law
between proprietorships and other forms of doing business was un-
fair. If husband and wife formed a de jure partnership or corpora-
tion, the Internal Revenue Service would recognize the wife's owner-
ship interest and exclude that portion from the deceased husband's
estate. When the business was conducted in proprietorship form,
however, the Revenue Service would not recognize any part of
jointly held property as belonging to the wife based upon her partici-
pation in the business alone.104 Thus, Senator Nelson explained, "it
is only the smallest and least organized element of the business
population that suffers from the problem. But 12 million of the total
of 14 million U.S. enterprises, that is, 85 percent of the total, are
unincorporated."''05 The Senator's second equity argument empha-
sized the disparity between sophisticated taxpayers who were aware
of the tax problems of joint ownership and could afford expert legal
advice and those less sophisticated who were unaware of the prob-
lems and could not retain expert counsel. The Senator noted that
the joint tenancy gift tax election enacted in 197606 would solve the
103. Id.
104. The favorable estate tax effect of operating in the partnership form was recognized
by the House Ways and Means Committee Reports accompanying H.R. 14844:
In the case of certain trade or business activities conducted in the form of a
family partnership, the partnership interest held by the surviving spouse will
not be included in the deceased spouse's gross estate. The effect of this is that
the services performed by the surviving spouse in connection with the family
owned business are taken into account, by reason of the profit sharing ratio, as
consideration furnished for the purchase of jointly owned property used in the
trade or business if a partnership is used to conduct business.
H.R. REP No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 3356-3373.
105. 124 CONG. REc. S5190 (daily ed. April 10, 1978).
106. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(c), 90 Stat. 1855 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 2040(b)).
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widow's tax problem for those couples starting out who were aware
of its provisions and had the benefit of expert legal advice, but it
did not solve the problem of existing estates which had appreciated
in value over the years and future estates of unsophisticated taxpay-
ers who could not afford legal counsel. The proposed legislation
would supposedly close this gap and provide equal treatment for all
taxpayers. '07
Senator Nelson's "Widow's Tax Bill" next appeared as number
104 of 106 amendments added to H.R. 13,51108 by the Senate Fi-
nance Committee on September 11, 1978. In proposing the amend-
ment, Senator Nelson, a member of the Senate Finance Committee,
repeated the policy reasons for the bill and its operational effect
previously discussed. The amendment was adopted by the Finance
Committee and reported on October 1, 1978 as section 504 of H.R.
13,511.09 The operational effect of section 504 remained the same
as Senator Nelson's original proposal in Senate Bill 2865. There was,
however, some minor modification of definitional terms."0
On October 9, 1978, after H.R. 13,511 had been reported to the
floor of the Senate, an amendment was proposed by Senator
107. The reasons for change in the law reported by the Senate Finance Committee and the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation echo Senator Nelson's arguments. See Gen-
eral Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13,511, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 286-87 (Comm. Print 1979) (prepared by the staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation).
S. REp. No 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6761, 6978.
108. H.R. 13,511 was enacted as the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763,
on November 6, 1978.
109. See 59 FED. TAX. REP. BuLL. (P-H) 43, § 2 (October 5, 1978).
110. Three changes appear m the Senate Finance Committee version of the § 2040(c)
amendment. First, instead of using the phrase "unpaid mortgeges on, or any indebtedness
in respect of, such property at the time the joint interest was created. "(appearing
in S. 2865 to describe the portion of the property eligible for "earn out" under the statute),
the Finance Committee version uses the term "acquisition indebtedness," which is defined
as "indebtedness which is incurred or assumed by the decedent and the decedent's spouse in
acquiring property but only to the extent that such indebtedness is secured by such
property." This change clarifies the statutory intent that only bona fide indebtedness of a
commercial nature incurred to acquire property will be eligible for preferential treatment.
Second, the term "eligible joint interest" is substituted in place of the term "qualified joint
interest" used in S. 2865. Apparently, this change was made to avoid confusion with the
present use of "qualified joint interest" appearing in I.R.C. § 2040(b). Third, the definition
of "eligible joint interest" was expanded to include "property used in any trade or
business," whereas S. 2865 applied only to "property which is devoted to use as a farm,
or constitutes, or is used in, a closely held business. "See S. 2865, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978).
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Melcher from Montana which recognized the failure of Senator Nel-
son's bill to attribute any of the appreciation in value of property
over the term of the marriage to the surviving spouse's interest
therein."' Senator Melcher favored a statute that would allow the
surviving spouse to earn out a percentage of the total fair market
value of the property on the date of death, less any consideration
furnished by the decedent spouse. He also proposed that when the
deceased spouse inherited property, the value of the property at the
time of inheritance should be regarded merely as consideration fur-
nished by that spouse, not value precluding the surviving spouse
from earning out a percentage of the appreciation in value over the
term of the marriage. Senator Melcher's amendment also proposed
an election procedure whereby the executor of the estate could elect
to have section 2040(a) rather than section 2040(c) apply to the
estate of the decedent.12
The Senate Finance Committee's version of section 2040(c), with
Senator Melcher's amendment, was passed by the Senate on Octo-
ber 10, 1978 and sent to the Conference Committee, where the stat-
ute was rewritten by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Tax-
ation in order to express more clearly the legislative intent of the
Senate. The statute, as finally drafted, differed from the version
reported out by the Senate Finance Committee in three material
respects. First, the final version allowed the surviving spouse to
share in the appreciation in value of the property, as proposed in
the Melcher amendment, by allowing the estate to exclude an
amount
equal to the sum of the amount determined by applying a percen-
tage rate of 2 percent for each year the surviving spouse materi-
ally participated in the business (not to exceed 50 percent) to the
excess of the value of the joint interest (as determined for estate
tax purposes) over the amount attributable to the original consid-
eration furnished by both spouses and (plus) the amount attrib-
utable to the original consideration furnished by the surviving
spouse."'
111. Amendment No. 2034, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S17,757 (daily ed. Oct.
9, 1978).
112. The reasons for the election procedure, which appear in the final enactment of §
2040(c), are not explained, but its effect is apparently to allow the executor to rely on the
family business case law in situations where the surviving spouse owns a greater than 50%
interest in the business.
113. General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13,511 Pub. L. No. 95-600, 95th
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The final version provided that "adjusted consideration" will not be
determined by the actual amount paid but will equal the actual
amounts paid increased by simple interest of six percent per annum
for each year since payment. The purpose of the six percent rule
evidently was to recognize the appreciation in value of the original
money consideration furnished by each spouse even though such
recognition was at an artificially low rate. The Senate version con-
tained the two percent earn out per year rule, but it was applied only
to the property's acquisition indebtedness. The Melcher amend-
ment proposed the earn out of appreciation in value but did not
provide for the six percent interest on other consideration furnished.
Second, the statute placed a ceiling on the total amount that
might be excluded from the decedent's estate: "The aggregate
amount by which the value of the decedent's gross estate may be
reduced .is $500,000 and the [amendment] may not result in
the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate of less than 50 percent
of the value of the eligible joint interest.""' 4 In other words, the
combination of the wife's services plus any other consideration fur-
nished by her can never total over fifty percent of the value of the
joint interest under section 2040(c).
Finally, whereas the Melcher Amendment offered an option to an
executor to elect out of section 2040(c), the final version of the
statute required an executor to make an affirmative election to
apply section 2040(c) by the due date of the estate tax return."'
V CONCLUSION
The present law provides two distinct options for achieving recog-
nition of the widow's material participation as money's worth con-
sideration furnished toward jointly owned property in the family
business. Through the executor of her husband's estate, she can
make an affirmative election to invoke section 2040(c)'s statutory
relief or she can rely on existing case law to prove her ownership
interest in the business under section 2040(a). Both options have
Cong., 2d Sess. 287 (Comm. Print 1979) (prepared by the staff of the Joint Comm. on
Taxation). Expressed as a mathematical formula: Amount excludible = (2% X yrs. partici-
pation) X (fair market value at date of death - adjusted consideration furnished by both
spouses) - adjusted consideration furnished by surviving spouse.
114. Id.
115. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(9).
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drawbacks. A favorable result under the case law will require proof
that the family business was conducted as a de facto partnership or
that an oral agreement was made to share profits. These are both
questions of fact, and the risk that a particular fact pattern may not
fit into the classic family business case is high. Additionally, the
time and expense required to pursue the case before the Service and
in court must be considered.
The major problems with section 2040(c) are its limited scope and
possible procedural problems in the interpretation and application
of its provisions. When the widow owns a percentage of the business
in excess of fifty percent, or when the dollar value of her interest
exceeds $500,000, or when significant other jointly held property,
e.g., investments, bank accounts, residence, was acquired with the
earnings from the business, section 2040(c) provides no relief. In
these situations, the wife will be forced to rely on the case law When
the statute is applicable, computational problems may arise in cal-
culating the adjusted consideration, both its actual amount and
interest thereon, unless adequate records have been maintained
showing both the amounts of such consideration and the date fur-
nished. Another problem is determining when the significant serv-
ices must be performed to gain recognition under the two percent
rule. If the wife performs services for years prior to the acquisition
of the jointly held property, does the statute apply' In other words,
must the joint tenancy have existed from the time the wife began
to perform the services? If, for example, the husband and wife work
together for forty years but the joint tenancy is not established until
several months before the husband's death, will the wife be permit-
ted to rely upon the provisions of section 2040(c) ? Also, how is
material participation to be determined-on a year-by-year basis
or in the aggregate ? These and other questions await clarification
by regulation or technical correction.
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